

be expected at a minimum. At a later date, similar bilateral arrangements could be sought with other Near Eastern countries.

3. During the *first* round of the talks, if the Israelis should raise the subject of a security guarantee, emphasize that the longstanding U.S. interest in Israel's security is well known to the Prime Minister and a willingness to listen to Israeli views on the subject. Indicate, however, that progress on an effort to limit the development of sophisticated weapons in the Near East should not be tied to other issues any more so than we have tied our nuclear test proposals to the issues of Berlin and conventional disarmament. Also stress that a favorable Israeli attitude toward cooperation [1 line of source text not declassified] will be of critical importance, in fact virtually a condition precedent, to our serious consideration of his request for a more formal security assurance.

If there are positive indications during the first round that some adequate arms limitation arrangement might be developed, it might be appropriate to indicate, but only in the *second* round, that we might in due course be prepared to go further in providing some security guarantee to support the independence and integrity of each country, either by Presidential letter incorporating a unilateral statement of policy or by Executive agreement (Tab H).

E. Areas of Caution:

1. Avoid commitments or implied commitments relating to (a) more economic assistance (other than possible assistance in the field of nuclear energy or outer space), or (b) filling demonstrable gaps in defensive weapons. These would be subject to review after a workable arrangement could be developed.

2. Avoid spelling out possible sanctions which might be attendant to any proposed scheme, but record any suggestions (Tab K).

3. Do not support any proposal for direct confrontation or communication between Nasser and Ben-Gurion. If assurances of the bona fides of the other are requested, point out that this should become apparent as the dialogue for an arms control arrangement develops.

F. Special Areas for Study and Recommendation:

1. The degree of interest and sincerity of Nasser and Ben-Gurion to an arms limitation approach and their initial reaction to the range of the problem.

2. The arms limitation and inspection scheme most likely to succeed, whether the U.S. role should remain a unilateral one and the role of a security assurance in such a scheme.

3. The incentives which may be required.

4. The advisability of using State visits for Nasser and Ben-Gurion to further impress them of the President's determination.

5. Steps to follow up the initial approach.